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A Test of the Modigliani-Miller Invariance
Theorem and Arbitrage in Experimental Asset
Markets
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ABSTRACT
Modigliani and Miller show that the total market value of a firm is unaffected by a
repackaging of asset return streams to equity and debt if pricing is arbitrage-free.
We investigate this invariance theorem in experimental asset markets, finding value-
invariance for assets of identical risks when returns are perfectly correlated. However,
exploiting price discrepancies has risk when returns have the same expected value
but are uncorrelated, in which case the law of one price is violated. Discrepancies
shrink in consecutive markets, but persist even with experienced traders. In markets
where overall trader acuity is high, assets trade closer to parity.
IN THEIR SEMINAL PAPER, Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963) show mathemat-
ically that the market value of a firm is invariant to the firm’s leverage—
different packaging of contractual claims on the firm’s assets does not im-
pact the total market value of the firm’s debt and equity. The Modigliani and
Miller—henceforth MM—value-invariance theorem suggests that the law of
one price prevails for assets of the same “risk class.” The core of the theorem is
an arbitrage proof, whereby if two assets, one leveraged and one unleveraged,
represent claims on the same cash flow, anymarket discrepancies that arise are
arbitraged away. But due to its assumptions of perfect capital markets and the
no-limits-to-arbitrage condition (which requires the perfect positive correlation
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of asset returns, no fees on the use of leverage, etc.), the MM theorem has not
been satisfactorily tested on real-world market data. Its empirical significance
has thus been unclear.1
Such a test is feasible in the laboratory, however. Providing an empirical test
of the MM theorem is a primary purpose of this study. Since perfect return
correlation is rare in naturally occurring equities, we also check how limits to
arbitrage affect the empirical validity of theMM theoremwith regards to cross-
asset pricing. In particular, we examine whether a perfect positive correlation
between asset returns is necessary for the empirical validity of value-invariance
or whether the same expected (rather than identical) future return is sufficient,
as suggested by the capital asset pricing model for our setting. Our data indeed
suggest that perfect correlation is indeed necessary for the law of one price to
prevail.
Our main design adapts the experimental asset market research of Smith,
Suchanek, and Williams (1988), which features multiperiod cash flows, zero
interest rates, and a repetition ofmarkets with experienced subjects.2 However,
in contrast to the standard, single-asset market approach of Smith, Suchanek,
andWilliams (1988), and in line withMM, we allow for simultaneous trading in
two shares of the same “equivalence class.” These “twin shares,” which we refer
to as the L-shares and U-shares, are claims on the same underlying uncertain
future cash flows. In one treatment, the returns of the L-share and the U-
share are perfectly correlated and thus any price discrepancies that arise can
be arbitraged away at no risk. In a second treatment, where the returns of
the L-share and the U-share are uncorrelated, we study the impact of limits to
arbitrage. In both cases, the expected stream to shareholders of L-shares andU-
shares differs by a constant amount, which we refer to as the “synthetic” value
of debt, as we discuss below, so the L-share and U-share represent “leveraged”
and “unleveraged” equity streams.
1 The assumption of perfect capital markets requires, among other things, that no taxes and
transaction fees be levied and that the same interest rate applies to everyone. Lamont and Thaler
(2003) present several real-world examples where the law of one price is violated. They argue
that these violations result from limits to arbitrage. An early objection concerned the applicability
of value-invariance in relation to the variation of payout policy. Modigliani and Miller (1959)
replied to this objection by stating that a firm’s dividend policy is irrelevant for the value of the
company. However, it is now widely accepted that dividends impact empirical valuations (for a
recent discussion of the dividend puzzle, see DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006)). With the dividend-
irrelevance theorem thus empirically rejected, it is considered as of theoretical interest only. The
value-invariance theorem and its proof, however, have remained widely accepted in the profession
even without empirical evidence to support it.
2 See Palan (2013) for a recent literature survey. The literature is mainly concerned with mea-
suring mispricing in the single-asset market. The conclusion is that confusion of subjects and spec-
ulation are the main sources of price deviations from fundamentals in the laboratory (e.g., Smith,
Suchanek, and Williams (1988), Lei, Noussair and Plott (2001), Kirchler, Huber, and Stoeckl
(2012)). Mispricing occurs in the single-asset market, and also when assets are simultaneously
traded in two markets (Ackert et al. 2009, Chan, Lei and Vesely 2013). Smith and Porter (1995),
Noussair and Tucker (2006), and Noussair, Tucker, and Yu (2016) report reduced mispricing when
a futures market enables subjects to arbitrage price discrepancies of underlying asset and futures
contracts.
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By comparing the market prices of shares, we present a very simple test of
the MM theorem.3 If at any point in time the price deviates from parity, in
other words if the difference between the L-share and the U-share is not the
same as the synthetic debt value for the investor, then a market participant
can exploit the price discrepancy. Since short-selling and borrowing is costless,
a trader can make a riskless arbitrage gain by going short the expensive share
and long the inexpensive share. Exploited pricing discrepancies thereby undo
the divergence of market values.
Our data provide support for the MM theorem since average prices are close
to parity, even though some price discrepancies and deviations from the risk-
neutral value persist throughout the experiment. In our perfect-correlation
treatment, we observe that perfect correlation is essential for value indiffer-
ence as we control for variations in correlation. In our control no-correlation
treatment, we consider independent draws of dividends of the two simulta-
neously traded shares. Here, L-shares and U-shares have the same expected
dividend and idiosyncratic risk as in the perfect-correlation treatment, but an
asset swap has risk.
We find a clear treatment effect: we observe a higher level of price discrepan-
cies in the no-correlation treatment. With perfect correlation our measures of
cross-asset price discrepancy, relative frequency of discrepant limit orders, and
deviation from fundamental dividend value indicate smaller deviations from
the theoretical benchmarks than in the no-correlation treatment.4 The market
corrects relative mispricing with perfectly correlated returns but not as well
with independent asset returns.
Thus, although potential price discrepancies never disappear in absolute
quantitative terms for the perfect-correlation treatment, our data provide
strong qualitative support for the equilibrium through the comparison of our
treatments. That said, as with evidence observed with experienced subjects in
single-asset market studies (e.g., Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair (2007), Dufwen-
berg, Lindqvist, and Moore (2005)), the price deviation from fundamental div-
idend values declines in consecutive markets in both treatments. The move-
ment towards the theoretical benchmarks, however, seems to be more rapid in
the perfect-correlation treatment than in the no-correlation treatment, both in
terms of the decrease in price discrepancies and the deviation from fundamen-
tal dividend value. Nevertheless, some potential price discrepancies persist in
both treatments, even with experienced subjects.
We next consider the impact of traders’ acuity, as measured by the cognitive
reflection task (CRT; Frederick (2005)), on the level of price discrepancy. The
literature suggests that smart traders search for and eliminate price discrep-
ancies.5 Our measure correlates with the reduction in price discrepancy on the
3 In Section II, we show how our design maps into the MM theorem.
4 In linewith studies that apply a zero discount rate in the Smith, Suchanek, andWilliams (1988)
experimental framework, we define the fundamental dividend value as the sum of discounted
expected future dividends.
5 See the discussions in Shleifer (2000) and Lamont and Thaler (2003).
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overall sample. Although there are some price discrepancies in markets with
higher trader aptitude, these are substantially less common and smaller. How-
ever, we find no evidence of subjects specializing in arbitrage, so we conclude
that existing discrepancies are dissolved by the equilibration dynamics of the
market rather than by skilled individual traders. Even so, low trader aptitude
leads to pricing discrepancies in the no-correlation treatment.
Overall, we provide evidence on how limits to arbitrage (such as our no-
correlation treatment) impact value-invariance. One main contribution is that
we are able to empirically validate value-invariance under perfect correlation.
A second main contribution is the observation of a treatment effect, since price
discrepancies in the market increase substantially when one moves from per-
fect positive correlation to zero correlation. The deviations appear to be driven
by relative overvaluation of the U-share. In the perfect-correlation treatment
these are evened out, but in the no-correlation treatment they prevail in mar-
kets with overall low trader aptitude. Finally, we provide evidence that high
trader acuity significantly reduces the price discrepancy in the market and
shares trade closer to fundamental dividend value.
We conduct additional treatments to better understand the patterns that we
observe in the initial perfect-correlation and no-correlation treatments. In one
treatment, we investigate 10-period markets with only a single asset present.
We find no systematic mispricing in this treatment. In an additional treat-
ment, we investigate a single-period market with two assets. We again find no
significant differences from parity pricing. Earlier experimental results show
that, in simple settings, double-auction market prices easily average around
the competitive-equilibrium prediction.6 We propose a more extreme test of
MM in the context of long-lived assets and declining dividend value, which is
known for being cognitively demanding. We find differential behavior in the
perfect-correlation treatment versus the no-correlation treatment.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section I, we briefly
review related literature and we discuss our experimental design. In Section II,
we discuss the MM theorem in light of our design. In Section III, we introduce
ourmeasures of price discrepancies and develop our hypotheses.We present our
experimental results in Section IV. Results of robustness tests are presented
in Section V and we conclude in Section VI.
I. Literature Review and Experimental Design
A. Literature Review
Our study contributes to the modest experimental literature on the market’s
ability to reduce or eliminate arbitrage opportunities.7 The documented per-
sistence in price discrepancies confirms earlier empirical results. O’Brien and
6 In the classic study of Vernon Smith (1962), market equilibrium dynamics were strong in
small markets. Gode and Sunder (1993) found strong equilibrium dynamics even in simulations
with randomized algorithms (“zero intelligence traders”).
7 See the surveys in Cadsby and Maynes (1998) and Sunder (1995).
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Srivastava (1991) replicate portfolios of options, stocks, and cash in a multiple-
asset experimental market with two stages and information asymmetry. The
authors show that if the information asymmetry cannot be resolved, price dis-
crepancies frequently persist.
Oliven and Rietz (2004) investigate data from the 1992 Iowa presidential
election market (IEM), a large-scale experiment conducted for several months
on the Internet. Arbitrage opportunities in this market were quite easy to
spot—if the value of the market portfolio deviated from the issue price, any
trader could make an arbitrage gain by selling or buying at said issue price.
Oliven and Rietz (2004) find a substantial number of price discrepancies, but
show that these were quickly driven out. Rietz (2005) conducts a laboratory
prediction-market experiment with state-contingent claims. Arbitrage oppor-
tunities were easily spotted (as in the IEM), but trading was over 100 minutes
rather than 100 days. Rietz (2005) concludes that this market is prone to
violate the no-arbitrage requirement. However, if (as in one treatment) the
experimenter automatically eliminates each price discrepancy, this automatic
arbitrageur was involved in most trades in the experiment. Abbink and Rock-
enbach (2006) report that, even after hours of experience, both students and
professional traders left arbitrage opportunities unexploited in an individual
task of allocating cash to options, bonds, and stock.
To the best of our knowledge, Levati, Qiu, and Mahagaonkar (2012) conduct
the only other experimental study to test the MM theorem. Their design pre-
cludes the possibility of arbitrage or (homemade) leveraging and unleveraging.8
Levati, Qiu, and Mahagaonkar (2012) examine evaluations of eight indepen-
dent lotteries with varying degree of risk in a sequence of experimental single-
asset call auction markets, where the risk represents the level of company
leverage. In contrast to our perfect-correlation treatment, but similar to our
no-correlation treatment, the market data in Levati, Qiu, and Mahagaonkar
(2012) show no support for value-invariance. The authors acknowledge that
precluding any possibility of arbitrage is a potential reason for this result.
B. Experimental Design
In our experiment, subjects could buy and sell multiperiod-lived assets in
continuous double-auction markets. The assets involved claims to a stochastic
dividend stream over a lifespan of 10 periods, T = 10, after which the assets
had no further value. The instructions can be found in the Internet Appendix.9
Trading occurred in two asset classes, which we refer to as L-shares and
U-shares.10 We follow design 4 from Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988).
Specifially, the dividend paid on an L-share was independently drawn {0, 8, 28
or 60 cents} with equal probability at the end of each period, so that the expected
8 Stiglitz (1969) proves MM value-invariance within a general equilibrium setting, without
explicit arbitrage assumptions.
9 The Internet Appendix may be found in the online version of this article.
10 In the experiment we said “A-share” and “B-share” instead of L-share and U-share.
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Table I
Initial Individual Endowments and Moments
The first column reports the individual initial unit endowments with shares and cash. The second
and third columns report first and second moments of dividend value distributions; aexpected
dividend value and total variance are per unit and period, t  T = 10. The initial total variance is
5,360 for each share; the initial expected payoffs of the L-share and the U-share are 240 and 480,
respectively. Variances and expected dividend values decrease linearly over time.
Initial unit
endowment
Expected dividend
value/unita
Initial total
variance/unita
L-shares 2 24 (T − t + 1) 536 (T − t + 1)
U-shares 2 48 (T − t + 1) 536 (T − t + 1)
Cash units 1,200 1 –
dividends per period were 24 cents on L-shares. The possible dividends paid
on the U-share were 24 cents higher, and so the expected dividends per share
were 48 cents on U-shares. The interest rate was zero and thus the discounted
sum of expected dividends, conventionally referred to as fundamental dividend
value, of L-shares and U-shares were initially 240 and 480 cents and decreased
by 24 and 48 cents per period (see Table I). After the last dividend payment,
all shares were worthless and the final cash balance was recorded.
Our treatment variation between subjects is the correlation ρLU between
the dividends on L-shares and U-shares. In the perfect-correlation treatment,
where ρLU = 1, the U-share paid exactly 24 cents more in each period than
does the L-share. In the no-correlation treatment, where ρLU = 0, the dividend
on the U-share was independently drawn {24, 32, 52, 84 cents} with equal
probability.
Each market participant could electronically submit an unlimited number
of bids and asks in the two simultaneous markets. Submitted bids and asks
were publicly visible and could not be cancelled. The best outstanding bid and
asks were available for immediate sale and purchase through confirmation by
the other market participants. Upon a transaction, all bids of the buyer and all
offers of the seller were cancelled in both markets and the price was publicly
recorded. However, the buyer may have also placed offers to sell and the seller
may have also placed bids to buy; any such offers and bids remained in the
market. So, any arbitrageur who wanted to exploit a price discrepancy could
immediately buy low and sell high by pressing the buttons.
Market participants were initially endowed with two L-shares, twoU-shares,
and 1,200 cents cash (see Table I). Traders were able to borrow up to 2,400 cents
for the purchase of assets and could short-sell up to four L-shares and up to four
U-shares without any margin requirements.11 The trading flow was unaffected
(i.e., there was no message indicating a short sale rather than a long sale) by
11 Subjects would not exhaust their borrowing capacity for strategic reasons. Only 0.1% of
subjects’ end-of-period records indicate a cash balance below −2,200. These results correspond to
individual bankruptcies. Bankruptcy rarely occurred and never occurred in the last two rounds of
the experiment.
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short sales and borrowings, which were displayed as negative numbers.12 Each
subject thus had a wide scope for financial decision-making.
To reduce confusion and in turn pricing discrepancies, subjects were re-
minded on screen about the expected future dividends and the sum of expected
dividends for the remaining periods. Dividends, prices (open, low, high, clos-
ing, and average), number of transactions, and portfolio compositions in each
past period were reported in tables. Since we are interested in the effects of
experience, an experimental session involved four consecutive markets, each
designed for nine subjects. The period length was 180 seconds in the first mar-
ket and 90 seconds in subsequent markets.13 One of the four markets was
chosen (with equal probability) for payment at the end of the session. A subject
determined the payoff-decisive market by a die roll. Subjects received their
final cash balance in the payoff-decisive market plus the payoff from two pre-
market tasks (detailed below) and a show-up fee of $15 in an envelope at their
cabin. In the case of a negative cash balance, the subject’s show-up fee would
be correspondingly reduced, but not by more than $5.
Subjects were recruited from a pool of economics and science students at the
University of California, Santa Barbara, via ORSEE (Greiner (2015)). Each
person drew a number from a tray upon arriving at the laboratory. This number
indicated one’s cabin number. Before the instructions were read for the trading
markets, subjects engaged in two pre-market tasks to reveal to us their relevant
personal traits. Information on payoffs from these tasks was communicated
only at the end of the session. The first task was an investment game to assess
the subjects’ degree of risk aversion (Charness and Gneezy (2010)). This task
required that subjects choose an amount 0 ≤ X ≤ $10 to allocate to each a
risky asset that paid either 0 or 2.5 Xwith equal probability and to a safe asset
$10 − X ≥ 0 that paid out with certainty. One of the nine participants in the
asset market would receive the payoff from the first experiment. The second
task was the CRT (Frederick 2005)), where the three questions were asked in
a random order.14 Subjects had 90 seconds to answer the questions and earned
$1 per correct answer.
As part of the instructions, subjects had to successfully complete four prac-
tice exercises: a dividend questionnaire, a trading round, a forecasting reward
12 Subjects would typically not exhaust their short-sale capacities for strategic reasons. Overall,
8% of subjects’ end-of-period results indicate negative shareholdings. The short-sale limit of −4
shares was reached in 2% of observations, of which more than 50% correspond to individual
bankruptcies.
13 We allowed more time in the first market for people to get accustomed to the decisions. There
is no evidence (including in questionnaire reports) that subjects were short of time in the shorter
intervals.
14 The questions were: (1) A hat and a suit cost $110. The suit costs $100 more than the hat.
How much does the hat cost? (2) If it takes five machines five minutes to make five widgets, how
long would it take 100 machines to make 100 widgets? (3) In a lake, there is a patch of lily pads.
Every day the patch doubles in size. If it takes 48 days for the patch to cover the entire lake, how
long would it take for the patch to cover half of it?
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questionnaire,15 and a second trading round. After the four markets, subjects
were debriefed in a questionnaire on personal details. The experiment was com-
puterized with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher (2007)). Written instructions
were distributed, and verbal instructions were played from a recording.
After conducting the two initial treatments, we conducted two additional
treatments to further investigate patterns found in the first treatments. These
consisted of 10-period asset markets with a single asset and one-period asset
markets with two assets. The design and results can be found in Section V.
II. Modigliani-Miller Invariance Theorem
In this section we discuss the invariance theorem of MM (1958) in light of
our experimental design (in particular, the perfect-correlation treatment).16
We begin by restating the MM [Invariance theorem] . . . (without taxes) and
sketching the proof (MM (1958) p. 268f).
“[Invariance theorem]: Consider any company j and let X¯j stand for the
. . . expected profit before deducting interest. Denote by Dj the . . . value of the
debts of the company; by Sj the market value of . . . common shares; and by
Vj ≡ Sj + Dj the market value of all securities . . . . Then . . . we must have in
equilibrium:
Vj ≡ Sj + Dj = X¯j /rk, for any firm j in class k.” (1)
The expected cash flows are discounted by the market-required return on
assets, rk, which is determined by the equivalence class k of the company’s
assets and the risk attitude of the market. The MM (1958) invariance theorem
states that the totalmarket value of the firm is invariant to its capital structure.
It implies that identical cash flows are priced the same in equilibrium.17
15 Prior to each period, subjects made predictions about the average prices at which the assets
would trade during the period. By asking subjects to reflect and predict market outcomes prior to
the period, we aimed to deeply engage subjects in the experiment. Similar to the design in Haruvy,
Lahav, and Noussair (2007), subjects initially submitted a forecast of the average price of each
asset for each future period. In our design, however, subjects only updated their price forecasts
of the current period prior to subsequent market openings. Subjects received salient rewards for
accurate forecasts—the mean percentage deviation of the forecast from the realized average price
was subtracted from one and the remainder was multiplied by $6. The deviation in any period was
capped at 100%. Periods without transactions did not count in the determination of the payoff, in
either the numerator or the denominator. Subjects were rewarded for either the accuracy of initial
forecasts or the accuracy of updated forecasts, with equal probability. The decision was made by
computerized random draw after the last market period. The reward from forecasting was included
in the subject’s final cash balance.
16 Comments from Bruno Biais, Peter Bossaerts, and an Associate Editor helped us significantly
improve this section.
17 Since in the MM world without taxes and riskless debt the assets are the same for the
unleveraged firm (U) and the leveraged (L) firm, the required expected total return on assets
must be the same independently of the company’s debt ratio (see MM (1958) equation (4), p. 268);
X¯j
VU
= X¯jSU =
X¯j
SL+DL =
X¯j
VL
= rk.
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To prove the implication of the invariance theorem, MM (1958) compare two
companies with the same total cash-flow X over the infinite horizon. The first
companyU is financed entirely by equity, so that at the end of the period equity
holders get the entire return X. The other company L is leveraged, with debt
of face value D, so that at the end of the period debt holders get rD and equity
holders get X − rD. MM then show by arbitrage that one must have VU =
SU = SL + D = VL, where SU and SL are the market values of equity, and
VU and VL are the total values of the unleveraged and the leveraged company.
Starting on page 269, MM analyze the arbitrage trade when the total market
value of company L is larger than that of company U, that is, VL = SL + D >
VU. To take advantage of this situation, the arbitrageur sells shares in the
leveraged company, borrows, and buys shares in the unleveraged company. He
is therefore long a portfolio whose value is that of the unleveraged company
minus debt service, and he is short the equity of the leveraged company. The
former is a synthetic version of the latter. Since cash flows on both portfolios
are the same, the investor is not exposed to risk. But at the inception of the
position, the portfolio purchased is cheaper than the portfolio sold. Hence,
there is an arbitrage profit. Since arbitrage cannot exist in equilibrium, the
proof concludes.
How does our experimental setting map into this? Consider two stocks L-
share and U-share. The dividend on the U-share is 24, 32, 52, or 84 with equal
probability. The dividend on the L-share is 24 lower than that of the U-share
(in each state). To map this into MM, assume the two companies hold the same
real asset. The payoff generated by the real asset is 24, 32, 52, or 84 with
equal probability. The U-share can be thought of as the equity share of the
unleveraged firm, which gets the entire payoff. The L-share can be thought of
as the equity share of the leveraged company, which holds the same asset but
that issued debt with value 24 cents (D in MM), and thus its shares get the
cash flow minus 24. The MM arbitrage argument states that the market value
of the unleveraged company, SU (the price of the U-share), must be equal to
the value of the leveraged company, which is the market value of equity (SL,
the price of the L-share) plus the value of the debt, D:
VU = SU = SL + D = VL. (2)
An arbitrage opportunity similar to that analyzed on page 269 ofMM (1958) is
one in which, in contrast to equation (2), the total market value of the leveraged
firm is larger than that of the unleveraged firm, asSL +D>SU. The immediate,
riskless gain from going long the unleveraged U-share and short the leveraged
L-share equals the difference between the two, SL + D− SU > 0. This arbitrage
gain results from the fact that there are no margin or repurchase requirements
in our experiment, all shares are cancelled at maturity T, and debt D is a
synthetic debt stream without real impact.18 In equilibrium, arbitrage cannot
18 Debt is a pure accounting stream not noted by experimental subjects. Trading costs and
interest rates are zero and the shares need not be repurchased but are simply cash at the end of
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exist. The prices of U-share and L-share must therefore differ exactly by the
value of debt.
MM (1958) discuss expected future streams and suggest one discount rate for
the same risk, but the proof of the theorem requires identical future streams.
One key research question that we raise in our experimental control treat-
ment (with zero correlation) is whether empirical validation of the invariance
theorem actually requires identical asset returns.19 Our research question is
two-fold:
(i) Are the prices of two portfolios equal when they have perfectly corre-
lated payoffs (modulo a shift) and when short sales and borrowing are
unconstrained?
(ii) Are the prices of two portfolios equal when their payoffs are uncorre-
lated but have the same distribution (modulo a shift) and short sales and
borrowing are unconstrained?
Question i) is a direct test of the MM (1958) theorem. For question ii), the rel-
evant theoretical result is that (in perfect markets) two portfolios with the same
payoffs should have the same equilibrium price (and this holds irrespective of
utility functions). This argument can be motivated by the capital asset pric-
ing model as described in the experimental finance literature (Asparouhova,
Bossaerts, Plott (2003), Bossaerts, Plott, Zame (2007),
[
SUt
SLt
]∗
=
[
FUt
FLt
]
− K
[
σ 2Ut ρLUσLtσUt
ρLUσLtσUt σ
2
Lt
] [
Z¯U
Z¯L
]
. (3)
This formula, adapted here to two risky assets, takes into account market
supply and demand. The equilibrium price is determined by the mean holdings
of the market portfolio Z of risky assets (as indicated in Table I); the expected
dividend payoffs of risky assets Fjt (j = U, L); the (harmonic mean) risk aver-
sion of the market, K; and the covariance matrix. With equal supply, that is,
ZU = ZL , equal payoff variance of L-shares and U-shares, that is, σ 2L = σ 2U and
zero correlation, ρLU = 0, the equilibrium price difference equals the difference
the market sequence. The accounting exercise is easy because cash financing and debt financing
have the same consequences in the experiment.
19 MM (1958, p. 266) assume identical risk classes “such that the return on the shares . . . in any
given class is proportional to (and hence perfectly correlated with) the return on the shares . . . in
the same class . . . ” These conditions are satisfied in our perfect-correlation treatment. Conditions
are similar in our no-correlation treatment, since the expected returns of assets are the same
as in the perfect-correlation treatment. However, returns are independent in the no-correlation
treatment so that, in the strict sense of the definition, L-shares and U-shares are not in the
same risk class. Our experimental test checks whether the strict implementation of the definition
is critical for achieving empirical support for value-invariance. In the laboratory it is not clear
whether notable differences can be detected. On the one hand, earlier research has suggested that
human behavior may disregard correlations between asset returns (e.g, Kroll, Levy, and Rapoport
(1988)). On the other hand, our setting favors pricing at expected dividend value, since subjects are
informed about the fundamental dividend values in the instructions, which could reduce confusion
of subjects and mispricing of assets (e.g., Kirchler, Huber, and Sto¨ckl (2012)).
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in expected dividend payoffs, that is, S∗Ut − S∗Lt = FUt − FLt, t = 1, .., T .20
Hence, for both treatments, theoretical arguments are available to expect par-
ity pricing in the market. We consider a perfect (no-fee) capital market setting
and ask whether actual human beings conform to the predictions of theory.
Riskless exploitation of price discrepancies is impossible where payoffs are
only identically distributed rather than perfectly correlated. So in this case
smart traders may require a risk premium to keep relative prices in balance,
thereby permitting a larger deviation from parity pricing.21 Evidence from real-
world markets shows that the relative mispricing of twin shares can occur over
an extended horizon when there are limits to arbitrage (e.g., Froot and Dabora
(1999)). Shleifer (2000) suggested that in the pricing of twin shares, “noise
trader risk” can result in limits to arbitrage. The risk exists that discrepancies
may widen instead of narrowing when traders follow price trends that move
away from equilibrium.
III. Measures and Hypotheses
A. Measures
We now formulate our measures and testable hypotheses. As above, let FUt
and FLt denote the fundamental dividend values, and let SUt and SLt denote
the share prices of the U-share and the L-share in period t, respectively. We
measure the relative difference from parity pricing of the U-share and the
L-share as follows:
t = SUtSLt + Dt − 1 =
(SUt − SLt) − (FUt − FLt)
SLt + (FUt − FLt) . (4)
The first ratio in (4) relates the value of the “unleveraged” company U to the
value of the “leveraged” company L, where the difference between fundamental
dividend values in the second denominator stands for the synthetic value of
debt, Dt = FUt − FLt. The right-hand side in (4) is obtained by replacing the
synthetic value of debt. The invariance theorem requires pricing at parity,
t = 0 (see Hypothesis 1). Thus, market values differ by as much as but not
more than fundamentals. In our data, market value is the averagemarket price
of the period.
20 Note that, in equation (2), the same is true for perfect correlation, D = FU − FL. The formula
generally holds if the agent buys for keeps (not speculatively), but it does not typically extend to
other utility functions (unless payoffs are Gaussian); variance is not the right measure of risk in
general. However, the CAPM formula provides a valid first-order approximation to prices if total
risk is small (see the proof in Judd and Guu (2001)).
21 We note that markets are incomplete in our no-correlation treatment, since a self-financing
replicating portfolio cannot be formed. Therefore, in incomplete markets, (riskless) arbitrage is
generally impossible. However, if market prices confirmed fundamentals or if deviations from
fundamentals were the same in both of our markets, no cross-asset price discrepancy would arise
and the law of one price would still obtain.
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We define the measure cross-asset price discrepancy, PD, as follows, where
T = 10 is the number of market periods:
PD = 1
T
∑
t
|t| . (5)
The PD is the average absolute percentage deviation from parity pricing
during the course of a market. A price discrepancy indicates potential gains
by selling high and buying low based on average prices. This value is usually
positive even if the average difference from parity pricing is zero. The PD is
zero if L-share and U-share prices are equal to fundamental dividend values,
or if prices deviate by the same amount from fundamental dividend values.
Even with zero PD, prices can deviate from fundamental value. To measure
price deviations from fundamentals, we define the relative absolute deviation
from fundamentals, DF. The DF-value here measures the expected excess re-
turn of buying and selling at prices off the known fundamental dividend value
(j = 1, 2 indicates L-shares and U-shares, J = 2):
DFjt =
∣∣∣∣SjtFjt − 1
∣∣∣∣ ; DF = 1JT
J∑
j = 1
T∑
t = 1
DFjt. (6)
The DF represents expected gains by purchasing one share if the price is
below or selling one share if the price is above the fundamental dividend value.
It compares the price to the predicted value under the equilibrium hypoth-
esis, whereas the PD compares the price to the predicted value under the
no-discrepancy hypothesis. By comparing the two, we can examine whether
mispricing is more severe with regard to dividend value or with regard to the
other asset. Note that DF and PD can be compared, which allows us to assess
whether the dividend value or the arbitrage opportunity drives the equilibra-
tion dynamics in our experiment. Similar measures for mispricing have been
proposed in the literature for the single-asset market (e.g, Sto¨ckl, Huber, and
Kirchler (2010)). In particular, the relative deviation RD of asset j = L, U,
where Fj is the average cumulative dividend value, has been used to measure
the magnitudes of bubbles in experiments:
Relative deviation = RDj = 1TFj
T∑
t = 1
Sjt − Fjt. (7)
Potential discrepancies can arise in real time in submitted orders. If the
adjusted bid exceeds the best outstanding offer of the twin share, an arbitrageur
can sell high and buy low to realize an expected gain. Under perfect correlation,
the gain from eliminating a price discrepancy is riskless (arbitrage); under no-
correlation, the expected gain is risky, since differences in future dividends
can lead to losses or gains. We refer to as discrepant each limit order that
(upon submission) leads to a cross-asset discrepancy in outstanding orders,
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that is, a potential expected gain for another trader.22 We measure the relative
frequency of discrepant limit order submission (RFDLOi) for each subject i
and then aggregate as follows (where #LOi denotes the number of limit orders
submitted by the subject, and #DLOi denotes the number of discrepant limit
orders):
RFDLOi = #DLOi#LOi ; RFDLO =
∑
i #DLOi∑
i #LOi
. (8)
We measure a trader’s aptitude as the reverse of the frequency of submitting
a discrepant limit order, 1 − RFDLOi. The trader’s aptitude is therefore high
if RFDLOi is small and vice versa.
Our empirical measure of acuity is the individual’s CRT score, that is, the
number of correct answers in the pre-market cognitive reflection task (Fred-
erick (2005)). Recent results in single-asset market experiments point to sys-
tematic effects of CRT scores (Corgnet et al. (2015), Akiyama, Hanaki, and
Ishikawa (2017), Breaban and Noussair (2015), Noussair, Tucker, and Yu
(2016)). Below, we also measure the effect of gender and risk aversion (as
elicited in the investment game) on our mispricing measures (4) to (8). Recent
research from experimental single-assetmarkets suggests that price levelsmay
be lower if the level of risk aversion increases (Breaban and Noussair (2015))
and also if the share of female traders increases (Eckel and Fu¨llbrunn (2015)).
B. Testable Hypotheses
With measures (4) to (8) at hand, we formulate our testable hypotheses.
Our most efficient theoretical benchmark (which is standard in experimental
studies that apply the Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988) design, but is
unlikely to obtain with inexperienced subjects in the laboratory) requires that
prices be equal to risk-neutral fundamental dividend values.
HYPOTHESIS 0 (Risk-neutral pricing): There are no deviations of prices from
fundamentals in either share class, that is, DF = 0.
In line with the literature, we also look at a weak form of Hypothesis 0,
that is, we investigate whether the RD measure is equal to zero on average.
Risk-neutral pricing would require that the price equal the fundamental divi-
dend value in each period. In fact, risk-neutral pricing is a sufficient (but not
necessary) condition for obtaining MM invariance (MM (1958)). Indeed, previ-
ous experimental evidence (Palan (2013)) shows that pricing deviations from
fundamental dividend value can be expected to occur in experimental asset
markets both from above and below. This evidence does not invalidate the MM
law of arbitrage-free pricing. For arbitrage-free pricing and the MM theorem,
22 In a different trading environment, Biais and Pouget (1999, p. 15) refer to similar trades as
“a noise trading [cf. Shleifer and Summers 1990] component in the order flow . . . as they [tend]
. . . to lose money.”
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we require that our L-share and U-share be priced at parity, which is indeed a
much weaker requirement than risk-neutral equilibrium pricing.
HYPOTHESIS 1A (MM invariance theorem): The adjusted market values of L-
shares and U-shares will be the same, i.e., t = 0.
HYPOTHESIS 1B (No cross-asset price discrepancy): PD = 0.
HYPOTHESIS 1C (No discrepant orders): RFDLO = 0.
Hypothesis 1A requires that an L-share and a U-share (adjusted for fun-
damentals) be priced the same on average. Hypothesis 1B (which implies
1A) requires that eventual deviations from fundamentals occur simultane-
ously and equally in both shares. Hence, we investigate three levels of mar-
ket efficiency: the first is based on the absence of differences from parity
pricing on average (Hypothesis 1A), the second is based on the absence of
price discrepancies (Hypothesis 1B) and discrepant orders (Hypothesis 1C),
and the third requires that prices coincide with risk-neutral dividend values
(Hypothesis 0).
These levels of market efficiency are tested in two treatment dimensions.
First, we consider perfect correlation, where elimination of pricing discrep-
ancies is riskless because dividend streams differ by a constant and can be
arbitraged. Second, we consider the case of no correlation, where elimination
of pricing discrepancies is risky because dividends are independent of each
other. Since the L-share and the U-share have identical idiosyncratic risks
in both treatments, and based on earlier evidence that suggests insensitivity
of behavior to changes in return correlations (e.g., Kroll, Levy, and Rapoport
(1988)), one might expect no treatment effect in the laboratory. However, the
MM arbitrage result concerns only the relative pricing of two assets, not the
absolute level of their prices. Thus, it could be the case that both assets are
mispriced in absolute terms but their relative pricing is aligned, so there is
no arbitrage opportunity. Given that mispricing is frequently observed in the
experimental design we consider, we expect to observe some mispricing in our
experiments, which leads to the following testable hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 2 (Hedging effect): The cross-asset price discrepancy (PD) is larger
in the no-correlation treatment than in the perfect-correlation treatment.
The above hypothesis suggests that markets can eliminate some price dis-
crepancies in the absence of risk even without a dedicated (automatic) arbi-
trageur, and so decrease the magnitude of PD in the presence of perfect cor-
relation. Hypothesis 2 points to the relative validity of MM invariance under
perfect correlation, relative to no correlation.
Based on experimental evidence of mispricing in early markets (e.g., Smith,
Suchanek, andWilliams (1988) and Dufwenberg, Lindqvist, andMoore (2005)),
we expect a decrease in mispricing in our consecutive markets.
HYPOTHESIS 3 (Experience effect): The cross-asset price discrepancy, PD, devia-
tion from fundamental dividend value, DF, and relative frequency of discrepant
orders, RFDLO, decrease over time (in consecutive markets).
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An oft-cited conjecture holds that smart investors eliminate mispricing in
the market (see, e.g., Shleifer (2000)). Although our design has no dedicated
arbitrageur, we can nevertheless address the predictive power of this argument
in our data. We compare the magnitude of price discrepancies vis-a`-vis charac-
teristics of market participants that suggest a relationship between the acuity
and aptitude of traders.
HYPOTHESIS 4 (Smart trader effect): The cross-asset price discrepancy (PD),
deviation from fundamental dividend value (DF), and the relative frequency of
discrepant orders (RFDLO) will decrease with the market participants’ degree
of measured acuity.
We are also interested in the equilibration dynamics of the market. When a
price discrepancy arises, that is, when the L-share and the U-share are mis-
priced relative to one another, at least one share (if not both) are mispriced
vis-a`-vis the fundamental dividend value. Exploitation of this mispricing leads
to expected gains. We expect that the more profitable trade will happen first in
both treatments. The more profitable trade is the one whose expected return is
the larger one within the discrepancy pair. It can be either a long or a short po-
sition. Moreover, we also expect, especially in the perfect-correlation treatment
(but also in the no-correlation treatment), that subjects exploit price discrep-
ancies by simultaneously taking long and short positions, thus eliminating the
discrepancy and booking an arbitrage (expected) gain. The latter behavior is
what MM suggest in their arbitrage proof.
HYPOTHESIS 5A (Equilibration dynamics): Where cross-asset price discrepancy
arises, the higher expected return twin share trades first.
HYPOTHESIS 5B (Asset swap/MM arbitrage): A subject exploits the price discrep-
ancy through (almost) simultaneous trade in the twin shares.
Finally, we investigate the effect of return correlation on individual portfolio
diversification. Portfolio diversification reduces fluctuations in portfolio returns
when correlations are smaller. Financial economics suggests that people are
averse to return volatility. We therefore conjecture that the difference between
the number of U-shares and L-shares is smaller in the no-correlation treatment
than in the perfect-correlation treatment.23 Let ZUit and ZLit be the number
of U-shares and L-shares in the portfolio of subject i at the end of period t,
and d Zit = |ZUit − ZLit| be the absolute difference between the two numbers.
We compare the average individual portfolio diversification over subjects and
periods, which we denote by dZ(ρLU), across markets and treatments.
HYPOTHESIS 6 (Individual portfolio diversification): Subjects are more diversi-
fied in the no-correlation treatment (0) than in the perfect-correlation treatment
(1), dZ(0) ≤ dZ(1).
23 Our measure of diversification is very simple. We look at individual deviations from the
market portfolio. Investor subjects are perfectly diversified in our design if they hold an equal
number of L-shares and U-shares. Different from the no-correlation treatment, return volatility
does not decrease with increased diversification in the perfect-correlation treatment.
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IV. Results
In total, 174 students participated, earning an average of $50 in three hours.
Each subject participated in only one session. We have 12 sessions in the
perfect-correlation treatment and eight sessions in the no-correlation treat-
ment.24 Each session comprises four consecutive markets.25
A. MM Invariance Theorem
OBSERVATION 1: L-share and U-share prices are close to parity and in line with
the MM invariance theorem in the perfect-correlation treatment. U-share prices
are above parity in the no-correlation treatment.
Support. In Figure 1, we see the difference in L-share and U-share prices
relative to parity for eachmarket, period, and treatment, aggregated separately
over the 12 sessions of the perfect-correlation treatment and the eight sessions
of the no-correlation treatment. In the case of a missing L-share or U-share
price, the period in the session is treated as a missing observation.26 The prices
in the perfect-correlation treatment are close to parity, whereas the prices
in the no-correlation treatment are above parity. In view of our theoretical
discussion, we note that no direction of deviation could be predicted. In contrast,
the data suggest that the deviation of relative market valuation has a direction,
indicating a relatively higher price for the U-share than the L-share.27 Below
we investigate this pattern further.
Table II reports the average differences from parity for each market in both
treatments together with the z-statistics of the two-tailed Wilcoxon one-sample
test, which indicates significant deviations from zero. The average results for
the perfect-correlation treatment are not significantly different from parity in
any market, t = 0; the overall average price difference from parity per period
is 3.67%. By period, we find that only 3 out of 40 (= 4 markets × 10 periods)
24 We do not have the same number of sessions across treatments. Unfortunately, we discovered
a problem in the software after conducting the first four sessions. Owing to this problem, the
L-share holders received no cash dividend; instead, both L-share and U-share dividends were
distributed to U-share holders. Due to logistical and timing problems, we were unable to book the
lab to re-run these four sessions and so have only 8 cohorts in the no-correlation treatment rather
the planned 12 cohorts.
25 In the fourth market of one session of the perfect-correlation treatment, one subject submitted
an obviously erroneous bid (instead of an asking price) for $20 on the L-share worth $0.24 that
led to a transaction. We eliminated this period from the data since the transaction impacts our
average estimates. In the second market of the two other perfect-correlation sessions, the data for
period 10 are missing due to a server crash. One session of the perfect-correlation treatment and
two sessions of the no-correlation treatments had only seven participants.
26 On average we have 11% and 5% missing observations in the perfect-correlation and no-
correlation treatments, respectively.
27 In this context the dividend puzzle comes to mind (DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006)), that is,
the empirical observation that the market value of dividend-paying stock is higher than of zero
dividend stock. Whereas the U-share always pays a positive dividend, the L-share indeed pays a
zero dividend 25% of the time.
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Figure 1. Evolution of the relative difference from price parity of L-shares and U-
shares t from Market 1 to Market 4. The abscissa shows periods 1 to 10 and represents
price parity between L-share and U-share prices. The ordinate indicates the relative difference
from parity from −0.2 to 0.6. Each chart represents the relative difference from price parity for
one market of 10 periods.
Table II
Average Difference from Parity  in Percent
The table reports the difference from parity (equation (4)) averaged over 10 periods and all ses-
sions for each market and both treatments. The first column reports the averages for the perfect-
correlation treatment and the second column for the no-correlation treatment. The bottom line
reports the average difference from parity over all periods. Asterisks indicate significant differ-
ences from parity measured by two-tailed, one-sample Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests. The last col-
umn reports p-values resulting from two-tailed, two-sample Mann-Whitney tests; z-statistics are
in brackets. Significant differences are indicated as follows: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
Treatment
Perfect correlation
(n = 12)
No correlation
(n = 8)
Mann-Whitney test
(between treatments),
p-value, [z-statistic]
Market 1 6.98 27.72** 0.031**
[0.39] [2.24] [2.16]
Market 2 1.72 29.92** 0.001***
[0.04] [2.52] [3.28]
Market 3 3.49 17.94** 0.165
[1.49] [2.10] [1.39]
Market 4 2.62 14.49** 0.064*
[1.26] [2.52] [1.85]
Average 3.67 22.52** 0.006***
[1.53] [2.52] [2.78]
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differences from parity in the perfect-correlation treatment are significant at
the 5% level; the pricier share is once the L-share and twice the U-share.28 In
the no-correlation treatment, parity is rejected for each market since the U-
share is always pricier than the L-share (see Table II); the overall average price
difference from parity per period is 22.52% in the no-correlation treatment, but
only 3.67% in the perfect-correlation treatment.29
So, the differences from price parity are much smaller in the perfect-
correlation treatment than in the no-correlation treatment. These differences
are 4 to 15 times larger in the no-correlation treatment in the four markets.
Overall, the average difference from parity per period across the treatments
is highly significant, with the p-value of the two-tailed Mann-Whitney test
equal to 0.006. We conclude that our data are in line with the MM theorem
(and thus with Hypothesis 1A) in the perfect-correlation treatment, but reject
Hypothesis 1A for the no-correlation treatment.
The results indicate that riskless exploitation of discrepancies, as in the
perfect-correlation treatment, is required to approximate value-invariance. In
the no-correlation treatment the discrepancy thus seems to have two comple-
mentary potential sources. First, the exploitation of discrepancies is risky, since
future dividend streams do not allow riskless arbitrage. The risky exploitation
of a discrepancy requires a risk premium, which implies larger discrepancies.
Second, the market discounts the U-share less than the L-share. In principle,
this could indicate the existence of a certainty effect in the data (Tversky and
Kahneman (1986)) concerning non-zero payoffs: whereas the U-share dividend
is strictly positive by definition, the L-share dividend can be zero in every pe-
riod. However, our follow-up treatments below do not find supportive evidence,
and so the reason for this behavior is not completely clear to us.
B. Pricing Discrepancies and Deviation from Fundamentals
OBSERVATION 2: The absolute difference from parity, PD, deviation from fun-
damentals, DF, and relative frequency of discrepant orders, RFDLO, are
reduced in the perfect-correlation treatment relative to the no-correlation
treatment.
Support. The data in Table III, Panels A, B, and C, record the averages of
PD, DF, and RFDLO by treatment, respectively.30 From Table III, Panel A we
28 The L-share is significantly pricier than the U-share in the first period of the first market
(p = 0.041), and the U-share is pricier in period 10 of the first market (p = 0.041) and in period 7
of the third market (p = 0.039).
29 Since outliers could be affecting the averages, we redid the analyses with median prices
instead of simple average prices. The results are very similar and are reported in Tables IA.I,
IA.IIA, and IA.IIB in the Online Appendix.
30 These values have been computed according to equations (5), (6), and (8). A missing aver-
age price of L-share or U-share in a certain period is treated as a missing observation in the
corresponding session. The minimum and the first quartile PD overall is 5.0% and 9.6% in the
perfect-correlation treatment and 8% and 12.8% in the no-correlation treatment, respectively.
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Table III
Average Absolute Deviation from Parity, PD; Average Absolute
Deviation from Fundamentals, DF; and Average Relative Frequency
of Discrepant Limit Orders RFDLO in Percent
Panel A reports the price discrepancy (equation (5)) for the 10 market periods averaged across all
sessions for eachmarket and treatment. Panel B reports the deviation from fundamentals (equation
(6)) for the 10 market periods averaged across all sessions for each market and treatment. Panel C
reports the frequency of discrepant limit orders relative to submitted limit orders (equation (8)) by
session for eachmarket and treatment. The bottom lines show the average price discrepancy across
all periods, and the one-tailed Page trend test, which checks for a significant decline in repeated
markets. The last column reports p-values resulting from two-tailed, two-sample Mann-Whitney
tests; z-statistics are in brackets. Significant differences are indicated as follows: ***p < 0.01, **p
< 0.05, *p < 0.10. aOne-tailed tests.
Panel A. PD in Percent
Perfect correlation
(n1 = 12)
No correlation
(n2 = 8)
Mann-Whitney test
(between treatments),
p-value, [z-statistic]a
Market 1 22.92 39.76 0.124
[1.16]
Market 2 13.69 30.09 0.014**
[2.20]
Market 3 13.82 23.31 0.198
[0.85]
Market 4 15.14 20.37 0.284
[0.58]
Total 16.39 29.13 0.082*
[1.39]
p-value (one-tailed 0.159 0.011**
Page trend test)a [−1.00] [−2.30]
Panel B. DF in Percent
Perfect correlation
(n1 = 12)
No correlation
(n2 = 8)
Mann-Whitney test
(between treatments),
p-value [z-statistic]
Market 1 24.59 39.52 0.320
[1.00]
Market 2 15.25 30.36 0.045**
[2.01]
Market 3 15.87 22.34 0.320
[1.00]
Market 4 21.65 17.35 0.758
[−0.31]
Total 19.34 27.39 0.563
[0.58]
p-value (one-tailed 0.159 0.001***
Page trend test)a [−1.00] [−3.30]
(Continued)
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Table III—Continued
Panel C. RFDLO in Percent
Perfect correlation
(n1 = 12)
No correlation
(n2 = 8)
Mann-Whitney test
(between treatments),
p-value, [z-statistic]
Market 1 6.76 10.90 0.190
[1.31]
Market 2 4.96 10.58 0.123
[1.54]
Market 3 4.81 9.61 0.105
[1.62]
Market 4 5.51 9.81 0.037**
[2.08]
Total 5.51 10.23 0.045**
[2.01]
p-value (one-tailed 0.242 0.460
Page trend test)a [−0.70] [−0.10]
see that, by buying the lower-priced share and selling the higher-priced twin
share (both at the average price in a randomly determined period), the average
riskless return would be 22.92% of the trading value in the first market of the
perfect-correlation treatment. This number is relatively large if compared to
the secondmarket, where the averagePD drops to one-half of the firstmarket.31
However, the amount of the decrease is rather small relative to the first market
in the no-correlation treatment. As indicated by the one-tailed Mann-Whitney
test reported in the table, the PD is larger overall (at the 10% significance level)
than in the no-correlation treatment.
We see in Panel B of Table III that the results for the DF point in the same
direction. The overall average absolute deviation from the fundamental divi-
dend value is 19.34% in the perfect-correlation treatment and 27.39% in the
no-correlation treatment. Nevertheless, the differences between the two treat-
ments are significant (at the 5% level) only for the second market. The results
suggest that pricing relative to fundamentals is (relatively) independent of
whether there are perfect arbitrage conditions. In line with the literature, both
treatments trend towards the fundamental dividend value with repetition. We
conclude that the data support rather than reject Hypothesis 2 and Observa-
tion 2 vis-a`-vis the PD andDF, particularly for Market 2, although the evidence
is not statistically significant for all markets.
Panel C of Table III reports the average number of discrepant orders relative
to the submitted orders in a market. The overall average number of discrepant
limit orders is 5.51% in the perfect-correlation treatment and 10.23% in the
no-correlation treatment. The differences are significant across treatments.
31 The decrease from the first to the second market is significant at the 1% level (Z = 2.353, p =
0.009, one-tailed Mann-Whitney test, n = 12).
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In terms of absolute numbers of arbitrage and mispricing, Hypothesis 0 and
Hypotheses 1B and 1C must be rejected given that no session and market
involves zero DF, zero PD, or zero RFDLO.
OBSERVATION 3: The consecutive-markets analysis suggests reduced price dis-
crepancies with experienced subjects, which occurs earlier in the perfect-
correlation treatment than in the no-correlation treatment.We observe no change
in the relative frequency of discrepant limit orders.
Support. The data in Panels A and B of Table III (see also Panels A and B of
Table IA.II in the Internet Appendix) indicate a decrease in price discrepancies
in the first three consecutive markets, but not always from the third to the
fourth market. The nonparametric Page trend test (n = 12, k = 4) as reported
in the bottom row of Panel A of Table III suggests no significant decrease of the
PD over four markets in the perfect-correlation treatment.32 In contrast, the
results reported in Panel B of Table III indicate a decrease for the deviation
from fundamentals that is significant at the 10% level. The results of the one-
tailed Page test are significant at the 5% level for the no-correlation treatment,
indicating a reduction over time in the values of PD and DF.
We find no significant evidence for continuous convergence to the theoretical
predictions over all four markets in the perfect-correlation treatment, since
convergence seems to occur all at once from the first to the second market, af-
ter which deviations remain at the same level until the end. Thus, the perfect-
correlation treatment exhibits a significant decline at the 5% level in the values
of PD and DF between the first and the second markets, but not between any
other consecutive markets.33 In contrast, the main decline in the no-correlation
treatment occurs from Market 2 to Market 3.34 Thus, the data suggest a more
rapid adjustment to the theoretical benchmarks in the perfect-correlation treat-
ment, that is, when exploiting price discrepancies is riskless.
Panel C of Table III suggests no decline in RFDLO by the one-tailed Page
test.
OBSERVATION 4: The differences between PD and DF suggest that pricing
discrepancies are a more focal driver of behavior than the deviation from
fundamentals in the perfect-correlation treatment when compared to the no-
correlation treatment.
Support. Comparing Panels A and B of Table III, the values of PD are smaller
than the values of DF for each market of the perfect-correlation treatment,
32 In Market 4 in some sessions, subjects pushed prices to irrationally high levels in late periods.
Even if these data points are ignored, however, the price discrepancies would not be reduced from
the level of Market 3. That said, the reported p-value of the Page test suggests that a declining PD
in the perfect-correlation treatment would then be significant at the 5% level.
33 The one-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks tests that suggest a decline between Markets 1 and 2
are as follows: PD (p = 0.010, Z = 2.316), and DF (p = 0.009, Z = 2.353).
34 The PD (p = 0.034, Z = 1.820) and the DF (p = 0.034, Z = 1.820) decrease significantly at the
5% significance level between Market 2 and Market 3, but not between Market 1 and Market 2
(p = 0.116, Z = 1.193), (p = 0.104, Z = 1.260).
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whereas they are larger for each market of the no-correlation treatment.35 The
average difference betweenPD andDF over allmarkets is−0.029 in the perfect-
correlation treatment and 0.017 in the no-correlation treatment. The difference
between treatments is significant—according to the one-tailed Mann-Whitney
two-sample test, the p-value is 0.071. Hence, the data suggest that pricing
vis-a`-vis the other asset is focal in the perfect-correlation treatment compared
with the no-correlation treatment. The results reported in part E of Section IV,
where we examine the equilibrating dynamics, underline this effect.
C. Bubble Magnitude
Following the standard line of experimental assetmarket research, we report
the standard measure of bubble magnitude RD (relative deviation) for our
treatments by asset. Given that the literature on the single-asset market shows
that asset mispricing occurs frequently (Palan (2013)), we have a surprising
result.
OBSERVATION 5: a) Asset prices average close to the dividend value in the perfect-
correlation treatment. The RD measures of the L-share and the U-share are
near zero. b) The price of the U-share in the no-correlation treatment exceeds the
dividend value, that is, RD is significantly positive, while the average price of
the L-share is close to the expected dividend value.
Support. Figures 2 and 3 show the average price trajectories for all sessions
and overall. Table IV reports for each market (by treatment) the standard
measure of mispricing—the relative deviation RD measure—for the L-share
and the U-share (and their differences) as described in Section III and as com-
monly applied in the literature (Sto¨ckl, Huber and Kirchler (2010)). The figures
illustrate observations 5a and 5b. The overall averageRDmeasures are−0.041
and 0.171 for the L-share and the U-share in the no-correlation treatment and
−0.025 and 0.023 in the perfect-correlation treatment, respectively. The de-
viations from expected cumulative dividend value are statistically significant
for the U-share in the no-correlation treatment, where RD is significantly dif-
ferent from (i.e., larger than) zero both for each market and overall. In the
perfect-correlation treatment, the overall RD measure is not significantly dif-
ferent from zero; a significant (negative) RD is only reported for the L-share in
Market 3.
Comparing across assets, we find that the RD values of the L-share and
the U-share are significantly different in the no-correlation treatment, while
in the perfect-correlation treatment there are no significant differences be-
tween RD values of the L-share and the U-share.36 If we compare RD val-
35 On average across all markets, the difference between PD and DF is significantly different
from zero in the perfect-correlation treatment. Per the two-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test, the
p-value is 0.0995. In the no-correlation treatment we have no significant differences between PD
and DF.
36 Based on the two-tailed Wilcoxon signed ranks test, we reject the null hypothesis of equal RD
measures between L-share and U-share for the no-correlation treatment; the p-value is 0.012. In
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Figure 2. Average prices in Markets 1 to 4 of the perfect-correlation treatment. The
trajectories of all 12 cohorts are displayed for both L-share and U-share assets, and the average for
each asset is indicated in bold. The dividend values are represented by cascading short horizontal
lines, but here they are almost covered by the lines that indicate the overall averages. The ordinate
indicates the average prices from 0 to 700, and the abscissa the periods 1 to 10.
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Figure 3. Average prices in Markets 1 to 4 of the no-correlation treatment. The trajec-
tories of all eight cohorts are displayed for both L-share and U-share assets, and the average for
each asset is indicated in bold. The dividend values are represented by cascading short horizontal
lines, which are well visible for the U-share, but are almost covered for the L-share by the bold
line that indicates the overall average. The ordinate indicates the average prices from 0 to 700,
and the abscissa the periods 1 to 10.
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Table IV
Average RDMeasure and Difference between Shares in Percent
The table reports the average relative deviation (equation (7)) for each market, assets L-share
and U-share, and treatment. The bottom row reports the average across all markets. The third
and sixth columns report the differences between RD values of assets L-share and U-share. The
RD values and their differences between assets L-share and U-share are tested, z-statistics are
in brackets. Significant differences from zero resulting from the two-tailed, one-sample Wilcoxon
signed ranks test are indicated as follows: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.10.
Perfect correlation (n1 = 12) No correlation (n0 = 8)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
RDL RDU RDU−RDL RDL RDU RDU−RDL
Market 1 2.80 9.48 6.68 0.24 22.13** 21.90*
[0.31] [1.02] [0.16] [0.56] [2.38] [1.68]
Market 2 −5.53 −0.61 4.92 −5.03 22.49*** 27.52***
[−1.10] [−0.39] [1.02] [0.14] [2.52] [2.52]
Market 3 −11.00** −2.19 8.82** −5.91 12.57** 18.48*
[−2.28] [−0.83] [2.28] [−0.21] [2.24] [1.40]
Market 4 3.68 2.44 −1.24 −5.54 11.40** 16.94**
[−0.24] [0.39] [0.24] [0.14] [2.38] [2.38]
Total avg. −2.51 2.28 4.79 −4.06 17.15** 21.21***
[−0.78] [1.26] [0.94] [0.14] [2.52] [2.52]
ues between treatments and shares, we find that only the RD of the U-
share in the no-correlation treatment is significantly different from (i.e., larger
than) the others.37 This misbehavior of the U-share is puzzling and seems to
drive the reported violation of parity pricing in the no-correlation treatment.
The Spearman rank correlation between RDU and  is 0.168 and 0.810 in the
perfect-correlation and the no-correlation treatments, respectively; the latter
indicates a significant correlation (p = 0.015) whereas the former does not
(p = 0.602).38 The question here is why the deviations occur in the U-share of
the no-correlation treatment but not in the L-share. Below we investigate this
finding further by looking at both the market behavior and the valuations of
the L-share and the U-share in the single-asset market.
D. Smart Traders
OBSERVATION 6: Individual performance (i.e., payoff) correlates with measured
acuity.
the perfect-correlation treatment, the p-value is 0.347 and so we conclude that the RD measures
do not significantly differ across assets.
37 The p-values of the two-tailed Mann-Whitney two-sample test (on the total average) are as
follows: between the U-shares (p = 0.000), between the L-shares (p = 0.227), and between the
L-shares and U-shares (0.007).
38 Note also that the differences in RD between L-share and U-share and deviations from parity
are highly correlated. The Spearman rank correlation coefficient is 0.862 in the overall sample,
which is significant at any commonly accepted significance level (p-value is 0.000).
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Table V
Regression Results and Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient with
CRT Score
In Panel A, the first two columns report the outcomes of the cluster regression with robust standard
errors of the within-group individual payoff and aptitude (the reciprocal of the relative frequency
of a limit order that leads to an arbitrage opportunity) on the individual CRT score (equation (8)),
risk aversion, and female gender dummy. The other columns record the OLS regression results of
measures (4) to (8) on the group average of the individual measures. Results of two-tailed t-tests
are indicated [z-statistics in brackets] as follows: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p  0.10. In panel
B, correlation coefficients are reported for CRT effects of measures (4) to (8) for each treatment
separately. Results of two-tailed Spearman rank correlation tests are indicated as follows: ***p <
0.01, **p < 0.05, *p  0.10.
Panel A. Regression results
Variable Payoffi 1−RFDLOi  PD DF RFDLO RDU
Intercept 2717.9*** 0.976*** 0.925** 0.949* 0.811** 0.345*** 0.514**
[22.8] [138.9] [0.02] [2.04] [2.73] [3.42] [2.77]
CRT score 161.8*** 0.005** −0.643*** −0.69*** −0.579*** −0.142*** −0.30***
[3.67] [2.07] [−3.84] [−3.10] [−4.06] [−2.98] [−3.34]
Female −241.0*** 0.008 −0.198 −0.164 0.114 −0.086* −0.058
[−2.90] [1.31] [−1.20] [−0.75] [0.81] [−1.82] [−0.66]
Risk
aversion
−0.76
[−0.59]
−0.000
[−0.52]
0.001
[0.12]
0.002
[0.29]
−0.000
[−0.09]
−0.001
[−0.75]
−0.000
[−0.12]
Perfect-
correlation
treatment
dummy
−0.824***
[−3.10]
−0.81**
[−2.29]
−0.506**
[−2.23]
−0.155*
[−2.04]
−0.369**
[−2.60]
CRT-score ×
treatment
dummy
0.646**
[2.42]
0.697*
[1.95]
0.427*
[1.87]
0.102
[1.35]
0.218
[1.53]
#obs. 174 174 20 20 20 20 20
#clusters 20 20
R2 .125 .039 .653 .484 .640 .591 728
Panel B. Correlation with CRT
 PD DF RFDLO RDU
Perfect-correlation treatment, n = 12 −0.236 −0.271 −0.236 −0.268 −0.168
No-correlation treatment, n = 8 −0.732** -0.634* −0.634* −0.683* −0.927***
Support. Panel A of Table V reports the regression results. We use the sub-
ject’s average payoff over the four markets as the individual’s performance
measure. As stated above, we measure individual acuity by the CRT score,
that is, the individual’s number of correct answers. The average CRT score
in our sample was 0.97.39 As a risk-aversion measure, we use the individual
39 This is a bit lower than average of 1.24 (see Frederick (2005), who finds an average in a very
large sample). Onemight have expected a better result here forCRT because of incentivization. The
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percentage allocation to the safe asset in the investment game (the average
allocation was 60%). Finally, we consider gender, assigning a value of one for
a female investor and zero otherwise. The share of females is 49% in our sub-
ject pool (see subject pool composition details in Table IA.III in the Internet
Appendix).40
The outcomes of the OLS regression of the individual performance measure
on the CRT score, female, and risk aversion are reported in the first column
of Panel A of Table V. The OLS regressions use clustered standard errors
(clustered by independent session). As indicated, the CRT score is a significant
determinant of an individual’s performance in this regression, but gender and
the risk-aversionmeasure, are not significant.We find no significant differences
across treatments.41 The evidence clearly supports Observation 6.
Instead of measuring performance by payoff as in Observation 6, we can
measure performance by the number of bad decisions in trading. As explained
above, we compute the ratio of the number of discrepant limit orders to total
limit orders,RFDLOi. We then compare this ratio to the individual’sCRT score.
OBSERVATION 7: Traders’ aptitudes are correlated with their measured acuities.
Support. The trader’s aptitude is inversely related to the relative frequency
of submissions of discrepant limit orders to the trader’s total number of submit-
ted limit orders, 1 − RFDLOi. As characterized above, a discrepant limit order
offers an arbitrageur an opportunity to realize an expected gain by swapping
assets. The measured trader’s aptitude is regressed on individual characteris-
tics. The second column of Panel A of Table V reports OLS regressions with
clustered standard errors (clustered by independent cohort). We find that indi-
vidual acuity as measured by the CRT score explains much of the bidding data,
in line with Observation 7.
OBSERVATION 8: When there is high overall trader acuity, price discrepancies
are smaller, fewer discrepant orders are submitted, and the price of assets is
closer to parity.
Support. In Panel A of Table V we also report four OLS regressions of our
measures (4), (5), (6), and (8) on the group aggregate personal measures. In
these regressions the average CRT score always shows up significantly. The
difference of price from parity, deviation from fundamentals, and price dis-
crepancy as well as the relative frequency of discrepant orders decrease in
markets with overall higher trader acuity. In the regression, we also control for
lower number could have resulted from the fact that our subjects were time-constrained whereas
Frederick’s were not.
40 As in many previous studies (see Charness and Gneezy (2012)), we find that females are
significantly more financially risk-averse than males (Z = 2.366, p = 0.018, two-tailed test). In
line with the results of Frederick (2005), we also find that males in our sample have significantly
higher CRT scores (Z = 3.838, p < 0.001, two-tailed test).
41 The two-tailed Mann-Whitney test between treatments returns the following p-values on
the individual-level data: 0.559, risk aversion, 0.809, female, and 0.987, CRT score, and similar
p-values obtain in the session-level data, 0.165, risk aversion, 0.754, female, and 0.529, CRT score.
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treatment effects of CRT. As the interaction with the treatment dummy indi-
cates, the CRT effect is strong for the no-correlation treatment. In Panel B of
Table V we report Spearman rank-correlation coefficients of theCRT score with
our measures of market efficiency. The coefficients also hint at a treatment ef-
fect. The correlation coefficients usually have the same sign in both treatments,
but the magnitude of the coefficients is larger for the no-correlation treatment.
The results indicate that the reported CRT effects could be driven by the no-
correlation treatment. We therefore conclude that, in line with Hypothesis 4
and Observation 8, acuity could actually affect the reduction of price discrep-
ancy, but potential discrepancies do not disappear completely.
OBSERVATION 9: When there is low overall trader acuity, or low trader aptitude,
U-share prices exceed fundamentals in the no-correlation treatment. There is no
significant impact of trader acuity, risk aversion, or gender composition with the
L-share in the no-correlation treatment or either share in the perfect-correlation
treatment.
Support. In the last column of Panel A of Table V, we report results of a
simple OLS regression of our acuity measure on the group aggregate personal
measures for the no-correlation treatment. The results show that RD is in-
versely related to the CRT score. This effect is present in the U-share of the
no-correlation treatment only, as the effects in the L-share and in the perfect-
correlation treatment are not significantly different from zero (see also Panel B
of Table V).42
E. Equilibrating Dynamics
OBSERVATION 10: The relative frequency of discrepancies in the perfect-
correlation treatment is lower than in the no-correlation treatment. Where a
pricing discrepancy arises, subjects trade the high-expected-return twin share
first, rather than the less profitable one. Individual subjects rarely exploit pric-
ing discrepancies by asset swaps.
Support. As reported in Panel C of Table III, on average 5.5% and 10.2% of
all submitted orders lead to discrepancies in the order book for the perfect-
correlation treatment and the no-correlation treatment, respectively.43 We
observe equilibrating dynamics. When a discrepancy arises, a trade in one
42 A significant correlation between RDU and the CRT score is only notable in the no-correlation
treatment. Conducting an OLS regression (with CRT as the only explanatory variable) separately
for each treatment results in p-values of 0.318 (perfect correlation) and 0.026 (no correlation) for
the slope of the CRT score. The other explanatory variables, including our measure of risk aversion
and the gender share, have no significant impact on any RD in the two treatments.
43 The difference between treatments is in the expected direction and is significant as reported
above. The share of discrepancies and the PD in a session are highly correlated. The OLS regression
(on the level of the independent session) of the RFDLO on the PD indicates a significantly positive
slope (z-statistic of 2.43, that is, p = 0.026) and a coefficient of determination of 0.25. When a
discrepancy arises, the median response time is four seconds.
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Table VI
Equilibrating Dynamics: Relative Frequency of Market Orders in the
High-Expected-Return Share of Given Discrepancy
This table reports the relative frequency in percent with which the market trades the more prof-
itable rather than the less profitable share when a discrepancy arises. Significant differences per
one-tailed Wilcoxon signed-ranks tests are indicated as follows: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p <
0.10. The last column reports p-values resulting from two-tailed, two-sample Mann-Whitney tests;
z-statistics are in brackets.
Perfect correlation
(n1 = 12)
No correlation
(n2 = 8)
Mann-Whitney test
(between treatments),
p-value [z-statistic]
Market 1 85.0*** 95.8*** 0.054**
[2.99] [2.52] [2.47]
Market 2 88.4*** 98.1*** 0.086*
[3.07] [2.55] [1.71]
Market 3 93.8*** 81.8** 0.332
[3.10] [2.25] [−0.97]
Market 4 87.0*** 90.9*** 0.586
[3.07] [2.52] [0.56]
Total 88.6*** 91.7*** 0.758
[3.06] [2.52] [0.31]
twin share typically leads to a higher expected return than a trade in the
other.
As reported in Table VI, the relative frequencies at which the high-return
trade is made first are 0.886 and 0.916 in the perfect-correlation treatment and
the no-correlation treatment, respectively. The results of the Wilcoxon signed-
ranks test show that the equilibration dynamics work as suggested above, in
line with Hypothesis 5A. It is significantly more likely that a transaction occurs
first in the high-expected-return twin share, thus eliminating the price discrep-
ancy without necessarily booking an arbitrage gain. So prices are pushed in
the direction of fundamental dividend value.44
In fact, subjects rarely exploit the price discrepancy (as arbitrageurs would
do) by selling the relatively expensive twin share and simultaneously buy-
ing the cheap one. Such hedging trades happen about 1% of the time when a
discrepancy arises. Thus, our Hypothesis 5B is not supported by the data—
99% of the discrepancies were eliminated by independent trades in the market
rather than by individuals engaging in arbitrage, with no arbitrageur subjects
dominating the market. We conclude that the market equilibration dynam-
ics, rather than high-skilled individual traders, imply a narrowing of the gap
between prices of twin shares in our treatments.
44 The effect is a bit stronger in the no-correlation treatment than in the perfect-correlation
treatment. However, equilibration dynamics are strong in both treatments. The difference
is possibly related to the above-described fact that relative pricing is a more important
driver of price behavior in the perfect-correlation treatment than in the no-correlation
treatment.
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F. Individual Portfolio Diversification
Despite the fact that diversification can reduce return volatility in the no-
correlation treatment but not in the perfect-correlation treatment, the average
difference in individual subjects’ portfolios of L-shares and U-shares is 2 (=
dZ) in each treatment. The difference in individual portfolio diversification
between treatments is close to zero.45 Hence, we do not find evidence in support
of Hypothesis 6.
G. Summary of Experimental Results
We do not observe the pricing of assets at fundamental dividend value, but
we have support for Hypothesis 1A (MM invariance theorem) in our perfect-
correlation treatment, where exploiting price discrepancies is riskless. This
differs in relative terms when we compare the data to the no-correlation
treatment, where exploiting price discrepancies across assets has risk.
Hypothesis 1B (no price discrepancy) is not supported in either of our treat-
ments as price discrepancies seem to persist. However, under perfect correla-
tion, adjustment to a level where discrepancies stabilize is fast (achieved by
the second market), whereas under no correlation adjustment takes more time.
Hypothesis 2 (hedging effect) is thus confirmed: the price discrepancy results of
the perfect-correlation treatment are closer to the theoretical prediction than
those of the no-correlation treatment.
Support for Hypothesis 3 (experience effect) is no surprise: experienced sub-
jects trade closer to the theoretical predictions than inexperienced subjects.
Nonetheless, unlike the results of the single-asset market (Smith, Suchanek,
andWilliams (1988)), our data do not suggest a complete convergence on funda-
mental dividend values or vanishing price discrepancies in repeated markets.
Moreover, discrepant order submissions do not cease with repetition, as indi-
cated by the stable relative frequency of discrepant limit orders. We find some
support for Hypothesis 4 (smart trader effect), as our measure of aptitude in-
creases with our measure of acuity and whole market mispricing decreases
with acuity. To the extent that experience may substitute for initial acuity,
our results confirm other results in the experimental asset markets literature
(Palan (2013)).
The results support Hypothesis 5A. When a discrepancy arises, the more
profitable transaction occurs first, which pushes price dynamics towards fun-
damentals. These dynamics occur in both treatments. In the perfect-correlation
treatment, market equilibration vis-a`-vis both fundamentals and the balancing
of relative prices is strong. Both effects seem to lead to the confirmation of MM
invariance in the perfect-correlation treatment. We note that response times
to discrepancies are relatively low, and discrepancies are fewer than in the no-
correlation treatment. In contrast, we do not find support for Hypothesis 5B as
individual arbitraging through asset swaps is rare when discrepancies arise.
45 The p-value of the one-tailed Mann-Whitney between-sample test is 0.47.
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There are two surprising effects here. First, we observe no significant de-
viations from dividend value in the perfect-correlation treatment or for the
L-share in the no-correlation treatment. This result runs counter to reports of
mispricing in the single-asset market (see the survey by Palan (2013)). Second,
we observe a positive significant deviation from dividend value only for the
U-share in the no-correlation treatment, particularly when trader aptitude is
low.46 This effect seems to be driving the deviation from price parity in the no-
correlation treatment in the direction as reported in Observation 1. Regarding
the first effect, we must address the question of whether the co-existence of
two assets limits the occurrence of bubbles. It has been suggested in the litera-
ture that trading in two assets can lead to smaller bubbles (Lee, Noussair, and
Plott (2001)). Other papers (e.g., Kirchler and Huber (2012) and Palan (2013))
suggest that a careful explanation of the environment can also lead to smaller
bubbles. If not spurious, the second effect could result from a behavioral bias
such as the certainty effect (Tversky and Kahneman (1986)).47 L-shares involve
a possible zero dividend, since with a probability of 0.25 a zero dividend can
occur in each period. In this context it seems noteworthy that the cumulative
prospective utility of the lotteries corresponding to the L-share and the U-share
differs by more than the difference in expected value when the parameter es-
timates of Tversky and Kahneman (1992) are applied. There is a small risk
of not receiving any dividend pay at all. Given the extant literature and our
no-correlation treatment results, we test the following hypothesis.
HYPOTHESIS 7 (certainty effect): Share prices are higher when possible divi-
dends are strictly positive than when dividends can be zero.
We test this hypothesis in the following section using a between-subjects
single-asset market experimental design. In one treatment subjects trade the
L-share and in the other treatment they trade the U-share. We expect the RD
measure to be higher for the U-share than for the L-share. If we do not observe
this effect in the single-asset market setting, we must conclude that the price
of the U-share results from relative market valuation in the no-correlation
treatment.
V. Further Experiments
We conducted two additional treatments to further investigate patterns
found in our two initial treatments. We describe these additional treatments
below.
46 The correlation of the U-share bubble with low trader aptitude could be a spurious
effect.
47 Tversky and Kahneman (1986) report evidence on the common ratio effect. In binary-choice
tasks with a safe play and a risky lottery, they find that subjects had a preference for the safe play
if the risky lottery involved the possibility of a zero payoff.
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A. Single-Asset Market Experiments
We conducted a third treatment with only one asset to try to cleanly address
whether the nonexistence of bubbles reported above results from the two-asset
environment or from our general settings.48 This third treatment also helps us
address Observation 5b to see whether the higher relative market valuation of
the U-share in the no-correlation treatment is a behavioral artifact similar to
the dividend puzzle, according to which shares with nonzero dividends fetch a
higher price (DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006)).
The experimental procedures in the single-asset market experiments were
the same as those described above (see the instructions in the Internet Ap-
pendix). However, instead of simultaneous trading in two assets, subjects
traded in a single-asset market involving 10 end-of-period dividend draws. Ap-
plying between-subjects variation, subjects traded the shares with the equally
likely dividends {0, 8, 28, 60} in the L-share treatment and with the equally
likely dividends {24, 32, 56, 84} in the U-share treatment. Different from the
original sessions, subjects participated in only two (not four) consecutive rep-
etitions of the asset market.49 The expected payoff for participation in the
experiment was the same across all treatments. In the L-share treatment, sub-
jects were endowed with six shares, and in the U-share treatment subjects
were endowed with three shares. Subjects were able to short-sell double the
number of shares with which they were endowed.
The data include eight independent cohorts in each of the L-share and U-
share treatments, with each trading for two consecutive market rounds in the
continuous double auction. A total of 138 subjects participated in these sessions.
As before, the market size was nine.50
OBSERVATION 11: L-share andU-share average prices are close to dividend value
in the single-asset environment.
Support. Table VII reports the RD measures for the two single-asset treat-
ments. The results of theWilcoxon signed-ranks test indicate that deviations of
the RDmeasures are not significantly different from zero for any market of the
single-asset treatments. Compared to theRDmeasure of the U-share in the no-
correlation treatment, the RD measure in the single-asset market treatments
48 Besides the two-asset setting, other features in our design could have contributed to the nonex-
istence of bubbles. Subjects had to pass several comprehension tests and the expected dividend
value was exhibited in each period on subjects’ screens. This transparency may have decreased
the lack of common knowledge (Cheung, Hedgaard, and Palan (2014)). Short-selling is possible,
which can increase downward pressures of prices (Haruvy and Noussair (2006)). Also, the number
of periods is 15 in the standard setting whereas it is 10 in ours.
49 In total, subjects traded three times in 10 periods in continuous double-auction markets.
Subjects traded in the L-share or the U-share twice. The third market of trading involved another
experiment with single-period markets, which we describe further below. In half of the sessions,
we had the two single-asset markets first and then the single-period markets. In the other half the
ordering was reversed. We find no evidence of order effects, so we pool the data.
50 In each of the two treatments, we had one cohort with seven, another with eight, and six with
nine participants.
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Table VII
RD in Single-Asset Market Experiment in Percent
This table reports the RD values for the single-asset sessions. There are no significant differences
from zero per the two-tailedWilcoxon signed-ranks tests. The last column reports p-values resulting
from two-tailed, two-sample Mann-Whitney tests, z-statistics are in brackets.
L-share treatment
(n1 = 8)
U-share treatment
(n2 = 8)
Mann-Whitney test
(between treatments),
p-value [z-statistic]
Market 1 3.57 −2.00 1.000
[0.42] [0.42] [0.00]
Market 2 −6.33 −2.29 0.529
[−0.42] [0.00] [−0.63]
Total average −1.38 −2.15 0.753
[−0.14] [0.28] [−0.32]
is significantly smaller. Compared to each other, compared to the L-share in the
no-correlation treatment, and compared to both the L-share and the U-share
in the perfect-correlation treatment, all differences are insignificant according
to a two-tailed Mann-Whitney test of two independent samples.51
Observation 11 indicates that we have no systematic mispricing in the single-
asset treatments. Prior literature has suggested that carefully introducing sub-
jects to the environment could amend mispricing (Palan (2013)). In our exper-
iment, subjects were informed in each period about the remaining dividend
draws and the expected sum of remaining dividends. It is quite possible that
this information influenced the decision-making of subjects in our markets.52
Given Observation 11, we find no support for Hypothesis 7 in the single-asset
environment. The relatively high valuation of the U-share in the no-correlation
treatment seems to be an artifact of relative valuation. To see whether this re-
sult and also the confirmation of the MM theorem is an artifact of the described
environment (Smith, Suchanek, and Williams (1988)), in the following section
we report another presumably simpler experimental treatment with single-
period markets.
B. Single-Period Market Experiments
Our fourth treatment involves single-period asset markets with four rep-
etitions and a 10-fold dividend.53 The overall procedures were the same as
51 The p-values of the test between single-asset market treatments are reported in the table. The
p-values between RDs for the U-share in the no-correlation treatment and the U-share treatment
are 0.046 and 0.016 for the first and second market, respectively; these p-values for the L-share
treatment are 0.074 and 0.002, respectively. All other between-treatment comparisons, as listed in
the text, show p-values above 0.480.
52 We provided this information to the subjects in an effort to reduce the cognitive burden in
this rather complex environment. This may have also served to reduce bubbles, but this was not
the primary point of the paper.
53 In total there were 10 periods. The described assets were traded in periods 1, 4, 7, and 10. In
the other periods, assets with the same expected values were traded. For ease of presentation we
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described above apart from the following differences. Subjects were endowed
in every period with two L-shares and two U-shares that they traded in the
double-auction market. These shares paid one dividend at the end of the period
and then were cancelled. In the experiment, one period would be selected for
payment. Possible dividends on an L-share were {0, 80, 280, 600}. In the perfect-
correlation treatment, the possible dividends on the U-share were always 240
cash units higher than the dividend on the L-share. In the no-correlation treat-
ment, the dividends of the L-share and the U-share were independent; the
equally likely dividends per U-share were {240, 320, 520, 840}.
Including the pilot session, nine independent cohorts participated in the
perfect-correlation treatment, and eight independent cohorts in the no-
correlation treatment.
OBSERVATION 12: We find significant differences from parity pricing neither in
any period nor in any single-period asset market treatment. Between treatments
we observe no significant differences in any period.
Support. Table IA.IV in the Internet Appendix reports the average difference
from parity for the repetitions. The results show that the difference from price
parity between assets is not significant in any treatment and period.54 There
are no significant differences between the two treatments.
Given Observation 12, on average subjects trade at fundamentals and at
parity. However, there are significant deviations from parity within cohorts. In
some cohorts the L-share is valued relatively above the U-share, while in other
cohorts the U-share is valued above the L-share. Hence, we find no support
for Hypothesis 7 in the single-period market; the high relative valuation of
the U-share of the no-correlation treatment is not reproduced in this compar-
atively simple market environment. In line with Observation 8, the shares in
the single-period treatment trade closer to fundamentals with higher acuity in
the market. In contrast to Observations 1 and 2, there are no significant differ-
ences between treatments in the single-period treatment. This result suggests
that the differences between arbitrage dynamics and equilibrium dynamics
cannot be easily detected in a simple market setting. To detect such differ-
ences, one may need a rather extreme test like the one we use in the context
of bubbles and declining fundamental values (Smith, Suchanek, and Williams
(1988)).
do not discuss these assets here. However, results based on those assets are completely in line with
the reported data. Please see the instructions in the Online Appendix for futher details. Subjects
traded in a total of three consecutive markets of 10 periods, one involving a single-period treatment
and the other two involving a single-asset treatment. We found no order effects in the data, so we
pool the data by treatment.
54 For completeness, the average absolute deviations from parity are 14% and 12% and the
deviations from fundamentals are 16% and 13% for the perfect-correlation treatment and the no-
correlation treatment, respectively. The absolute deviations and the deviations from fundamentals
do not decline significantly between repetitions in either treatment.
34 The Journal of Finance R©
VI. Conclusions
Our laboratory results support the MM invariance theorem in the following
way. As proposed in the arbitrage proof of the original paper (MM (1958)), we ob-
serve the same averagemarket values for shares of perfectly correlated returns.
The results suggest that perfect correlation of future returns (where price dis-
crepancies can be arbitraged away without risk) is required to obtain the law of
one price in our setting. This necessary condition is recommended through our
control treatment, where perfect correlation is removed. The deviations from
parity pricing and the observed pricing discrepancies are significantly larger
in the control treatment than in the perfect-correlation treatment. Despite the
fact that earlier research reports that behavior is insensitive to changes in
return correlations (e.g., Kroll, Levy, and Rapoport (1988)), we do find a signif-
icant effect. Under no correlation, that is, with independent multiperiod-lived
assets, we do not obtain the law of one price for the same idiosyncratic risks
of our single assets. With limits to arbitrage, the market manifests a risk pre-
mium. The (“leveraged”) L-share is less pricey than the (“all equity”) U-share.
This could be a spurious effect—our research in this respect is not conclu-
sive. We investigated whether this effect may be driven by a behavioral bias
in relative valuation similar to the certainty effect (Tversky and Kahneman
(1986)). The fact that the dividend in the U-share is strictly positive (whereas
the L-share dividend can be zero) could possibly bias subjects to push U-share
prices up when trader acuity is low. We observe this effect only in the two-asset
setting of the no-correlation treatment. The higher market valuation of the
U-share compared to the L-share treatment in the no-correlation treatment
is not observed in our single-asset market treatments. For existing limits to
arbitrage, our results (in the no-correlation treatment) suggest that capital
structure may indeed affect the market value of the company. The finding that
value-invariance holds under perfect correlation but not necessarily with im-
perfect correlation is a key contribution of the paper. This result is intriguing,
as the CAPM suggests that the law of one price holds in our zero-correlation
setting. This result, along with the result that single-asset markets behave
differently from multiple-asset markets, indicates that more experimental re-
search is needed to uncover the trading dynamics and interactions of multiple
multiperiod-lived assets.
Our study does not provide a test of the unrestrained validity of MM invari-
ance, since we consider a zero interest rate and nontraded debt. Nonetheless,
we note that we obtain this result in the standard setting of Smith, Suchanek,
and Williams (1988), known to produce mispricing among inexperienced sub-
jects. We find that value-invariance can also be obtained in simpler settings, in-
cluding those with constant fundamental dividend value. For the single-period
setting, our results suggest that the law of one price can be obtained on aver-
age even if returns are not perfectly correlated but only the same in expected
terms. In more complex settings, as suggested in our experiments with two
multiperiod-lived assets, MM invariance seems to require perfect correlation
of future return streams.
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Our results also shed light on different levels of market efficiency. We find
support for market efficiency in the case of riskless arbitrage. We also find
that market efficiency increases with repetition. Price discrepancies decrease
and prices move towards fundamental dividend value with repetition, and
we document the existence of equilibrium dynamics when price discrepancies
arise. We observe that high overall acuity, as measured by the CRT score,
reduces price discrepancy in the market. Deviations from theoretical predic-
tions become smaller when we look at markets with overall high trader acuity.
Nonetheless, the deviations are never entirely removed. So for the results from
our design, we have the sense that Rietz (2005) is correct when he states that
without a dedicated arbitrageur who takes advantage of any mispricing, the
laboratory market does not completely eliminate price discrepancies.
As is frequently observed with market studies, we conclude that the data
suggest a movement of behavior in the direction of the predictions of financial
economic theory, but do not provide full quantitative support for the theoretical
benchmark. Hence, as price discrepancies do not cease during the experiment,
our results hint at significant potential gains for arbitrageurs. In the real world,
exploiting price discrepancies requires that the arbitrageur take risk (as has
been shown in the twin-share LTCM cases; see Shleifer (2000)). So in the real
world, arbitrageurs may require deep pockets and patience to lock in their
arbitrage gains.
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